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1. Ten years have passed since the Central Asian states
declared their independence, but their relationship with
Russia still remains close, and the latter treats them as its
exclusive zone of influence. A crucial reason for keeping
Central Asia within the orbit of MoscowÕs influence is the fact
that Russia exercises control over the most important trans-
port routes out of the region of raw materials for the power
i n d u s t r y, on which the economic development of Asia
depends on. But this is the only manifestation of Central
AsiaÕs economic dependence on Russia. Moscow lacks solid
economic instruments (i.e. investment input or power indus-
try dependence) to shape the situation in the region. As the
present forms of political cooperation within the CIS,
Customs Union etc. are not bringing the  expected results, it
is the regional security system based on military dominance,
developed by Russia, which is particularly gaining in impor-
tance. Russia treats its direct military presence as a condi-
tion for full implementation of its policy towards the region
and towards Afghanistan. For two years Moscow has been
successful in this area. 
2. The basic reason why the Central Asian states are com-
pelled to participate in building regional order with the help
of Russia is the threat posed by the activities of fundamen-
talist Islamic movements. The most serious manifestations of
this threat were the two Batken-area crises in 1999 and
2000. The fear of the results of the current civil war in
Afghanistan is constantly growing. It is in RussiaÕs interest to
maintain the state of threat and tension in Central Asia, and
Russia fuels it and benefits from it. 
3. Central Asia is also an area of influence-building for some
Western countries (mainly Turkey and the United States).
Since last year, in response to a system of regional security
developed under the aegis of Russia, the United States and
Turkey have been  trying to get involved in military coopera-
tion in the region. Such measures do not constitute a coun-
terbalance to the Russian presence, but they do extend the
room for political manoeuvre of  the diplomacies of the coun-
tries in the region. 
4. Afghanistan and the civil war there is having a great
impact on the situation in Central Asia. The military success
of the Taliban in summer 2000 considerably enhanced their
prestige and increased fears that the conflict could expand.
They also made the Central Asian countries revise their pol-
icy towards Afghanistan. On the one hand, this means seek-
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ing protection against the Taliban from Moscow, and on the
other hand preparing to negotiate a peaceful relationship
(particularly in the case of Uzbekistan). The war in
Afghanistan and the increasing involvement of Russia, Iran,
India, Pakistan and the United States have more and more
influence on the political situation in Central Asia.
5. The Central Asian countries lack capacities to find 
a sovereign solution to their regional problems, particularly
the political ones. This is due to the internal weakness 
of these countries and the strong influence of Russia in 
the region. (This applies to Tajikistan the most, Kazakhstan
the least). For them the most effective way to pursue strate-
gic goals is to take advantage of the interests of foreign pow-
ers that are engaged in the region. This gives the opportunity
to manoeuvre between Moscow, Washington, Islamabad and
others, which they are trying to do. 
6. The key country for security issues of the region is
Uzbekistan. At the same time this is the country that faces
the most serious threat from fundamentalism, and the one
which is RussiaÕs most inconvenient partner due to its inde-
pendent policy. All the problems related to security, RussiaÕs
military position and the future political shape of the region
will be handled with UzbekistanÕs participation. The latter is,
and will remain, the main addressee both of cooperation
offers (i.e. from America and Turkey) and attacks (from
Russia). 
7. Despite UzbekistanÕs position and its significance for
political stability, it is Kazakhstan that is now strengthening
its role of a regional leader. This is due both to its natural
advantages (natural resources, geographical location, dis-
tance from the focus of unrest) and (relatively) reasonable
and balanced domestic and foreign policy of the president,
Nursultan Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan is the most stable and the
most promising, economically and politically, country of the
region. 
The Islamic threat 
in Central Asia 
In 1997 the five-year civil war in Tajikistan between the Islamic
opposition and the post-communist government, supported by
Russia and TajikistanÕs neighbours, came to an end. As a result 
a new balance of power between the fighting parties came into
being, and the governing party assumed a dominant position. 
In practical terms, it meant that the country was broken up into
small ÔduchiesÕ. No one exercised any control over them and there
were excellent conditions for criminal activities (mainly connect-
ed to drugs trade) and quasi-political activities (military troops
without any supervision, training camps for mujahideen, etc.) 1.
A lasting element of the new political order is the presence 
of Russian bases on the territory of Tajikistan Ð the only country
in the region where there are still permanent Russian troop bases.
H o w e v e r, when the war in Tajikistan came to an end it seemed that
the threat of Islamic fundamentalism had been prevented.
The event that proved that it was just to the contrary was a series
of bomb attacks on the president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov 
in February 1999. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),
the armed Islamic opposition operating in Tajikistan and
Afghanistan, associated with leaders of the former Tajik opposi-
tion from the war period, claimed responsibility for the attack.
The (unsuccessful) attacks on Karimov turned out to be just the
beginning: between August and November 1999 fighting broke
out in Kyrgyzstan, in the Batken area, between the IMU and
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan forces. According to the IMU the aim
of the operation was to foment an uprising in the Uzbek part of
the Fergana Valley and to found an Islamic state there. After 
a four-month crisis, the undefeated mujahideen withdrew to
Tajikistan, taking a ransom for hostages.
The crisis has revealed Ky r g y z s t a nÕs total incapability and
UzbekistanÕs limited effectiveness in finding a sovereign military
solution to such problems. In the aftermath of the crisis some ini-
tiatives have emerged aimed at creating a regional security sys-
tem. The common denominator of these projects was the partic-
ipation of Russia as main guardian and ally, offering political and
military support (related to equipment, training and counselling).
For Uzbekistan this meant giving up the policy of independence
from Russia and the policy of close military and political copera-
tion with NATO (the United States and Turkey). 
The Batken scenario repeated itself in August and September
2000. IMU troops attacked the border of Kyrgyzstan in the direc-
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tion of Batken; moreover, they invaded the southern section of the
Tajik-Uzbek border (the Surhandarian district). There were also
incidental clashes farther into Uzbekistan (the Kamchik pass, 
in the Tashkent area). The mujahideen failed to fight their way
through to the mainland of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (if that was
really their aim, which is not evident). After Batken 2000, and 
a period of waiting for another similar operation (Batken 2001?),
the military cooperation between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakh-
stan and Russia was enhanced. Karimov, however, accused 
the Tajik (and indirectly the Russian) authorities of being passive
during the crisis and tolerating the presence of the IMU in Taji-
kistan, and he once again tried to distance himself from Moscow
(this subject will be elaborated later on).
The problem of Afghanistan
Another destabilising factor in Central Asia, apart from the IMUÕs
activities, is the civil war, which has been going on for 21 years.
AfghanistanÕs negative influence has escalated with the rise of
the Taliban as a dominant force (since 1995Ð6), who were iden-
tified with extremely aggressive Islamic fundamentalism.
Moreover, Afghanistan has become the world centre for produc-
ing opium and its derivatives. Drugs are being smuggled to the
north through the post-Soviet republics. A great problem for the
neighbours is also refugees, who are constantly fleeing in great
numbers from Afghanistan. Eventually Afghanistan became 
a base for mujahideen operating in Tajikistan, in the Caucasus,
Kashmir and so on. Many politicians were afraid that the Taliban
wanted further expansion north (and the media were portraying it
as a certainty). This exacerbated hostilities between the Central
Asian countries and Russia, and was partly the reason why both
Russia and the countries of Central Asia (particularly Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan) supported the opponents of the Taliban Ð the le-
g a l government of the so-called Northern Alliance, led by Presi-
dent Rabani and Ahmed Shah Masoud. 
In September 2000 the situation on the Afghan front reached 
a critical point, when it seemed that another offensive of the Tali-
ban would ultimately defeat the Alliance and enable them to take
control over the whole country 2. Only immediate help in providing
military equipment offered by Russia, Iran and India, and Iranian
aid in preventing internal tensions in the Alliance saved Masoud
from defeat and thus enabled him to go onto the counteroffensive.
The summer successes of the Taliban led to considerable agita-
tion in the Central Asian capitals, and the Taliban themselves
came to be perceived as a serious political factor for the region.
The role of Afghanistan began to resemble the role of Batken Ð 
it became a threat that only Russia can face and thus become 
a guardian of safety for the Central Asian republics. 
Central Asian countries 
in the face of threats
The fears of Islamic threat in the Central Asian countries are hard-
ly unfounded. In particular the threat concerns Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and to an extent also Tajikistan. Both Batken crises
have proved that a relatively small group of mujahideen can shake
the foundations of a small country like Kyrgyzstan, and even of the
regional power Uzbekistan. During Batken 1999 the IMU forces
numbered not more than 400 mujahideen; during Batken 2000
there were several units, each of them numbering several dozens.
Their action have caused significant political shifts, rapid arma-
ment escalation and acceleration of reforms in the army (which
had not been capable of defending the country), massive invest-
ments in border fortifications and in planting minefields 3.
These events unveiled the complexity of internal problems that
the young Central Asian states failed to deal with successfully 4.
They include, among other elements; internal ethnic conflicts, re-
gional conflicts, social crises caused by a general population explo-
sion, unemployment and lack of prospects, and economic depres-
sion. Last but not least, one cannot fail to notice the weaknesses
of the political systems in the countries of the region, particularly 
in Uzbekistan: power is centralised, exercised by the president and
a narrow para-mafia of groups comprising his followers. There is
no room for any opposition, which means there is also no room for
channelling social discontent or for developing a state- b u i l d i n g
elite. In extreme circumstances, this would mean that the downfall
of the president may lead to the break-up of the country.
The complex of problems related to the Islamic and Afghan threat
has once again exposed the total incapability of the countries of
the region to cooperate effectively in the face of threat. Despite
the fact that numerous agreements and aid declarations were
signed during successive crises, it was not possible to carry out
a collective operation against the IMU, and Russia was obliged to
participate in all the potential projects. The lack of cooperation
among Tashkent, Dushanbe, Bishkek and Astana is the result of
long-escalating conflicts related to economy, politics, ethnic
issues and power struggles in the region, particularly between
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The attitude of Tajik politicians
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proves beyond doubt that the IMU activity targeted at Uzbekistan
is accomodating to it Ð the troubles that IMU causes to Tashkent
prevent the latter from becoming involved in the internal affairs
of Tajikistan, as had previously been the case. 
The Islamic threat, with the whole complexity of that problem, 
is a serious challenge to a region thatis capable of facing it unaid-
ed to only a very limited extent. 
We should, however, bear in mind another aspect of the changes
taking place in the region: the increased significance of the posi-
tion of Kazakhstan with respect to Uzbekistan. 
The last decade bore witness to a power struggle in the region
between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Presently one can speak
about the dynamically increasing dominance of Kazakhstan,
which is due both to its different strategic aims of the passing
decade and to the processes that have been taking place for the
last two years. In this struggle the trump card of Uzbekistan was
first of all its military and population potential, with which help
President Islam Karimov was trying to replace Russia in the role
of regional ruling power. The problems that appeared in connec-
tion with Islamic fundamentalism revealed the limitations 
of Uzbekistan and shook its position. Consequently Uzbekistan is
becoming more and more isolated, whereas Kazakhstan has cho-
sen the policy of mitigating internal conflicts, political stability
and creating conditions that are conducive to economic develop-
ment. In his international policy, President Nursultan Nazarbayev
succeeded in avoiding major conflicts and in developing cooper-
ation both with Russia and with the West; the results of such
approach are already becoming visible, particularly when seen in
the light of UzbekistanÕs regress. Also, the present threats con-
nected to fundamentalism and to the war in Afghanistan have 
a much more negative impact on Uzbekistan than they have on
Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan may be very close to the problem
(among others the IMU has attacked near the border with
Uzbekistan, and there is the problem of drugs from Afghanistan)
but it is Uzbekistan that is in the very centre of the problem.
Kazakhstan can find a way to cooperate with Russia, and also
room for its own military presence in the region, whereas
Uzbekistan holds the opinion that this approach basically contra-
dicts the strategic aims of regional policy. As a result, relative
internal stability, growing economic potential and a foreign policy
aware of its limitations allow Kazakhstan more room for political
manoeuvre, more reliable instruments for building its influence in
the region, and a much better bargaining position in its relation-
ship with Moscow, Washington and with other capitals. 
A new security system
The crisis growing around the problem of fundamentalism was 
a major breakthrough in the relationship between Central Asia
and Russia in such areas as security and military cooperation.
Until the time of the Batkan crises, the main forms of Russian
military presence in the region were the forces stationed 
in Tajikistan (201st Mechanised Division and border protection
forces). The link between Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan and Russia was the Tashkent Agreement 5, that guar-
anteed aid in case of external threat. But the Agreement remained
a paper treaty, which was further confirmed by the departure of
Uzbekistan (1999). 
At the same time Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan (formal-
ly) and Uzbekistan were connected with the NATO project
ÔPartnership for PeaceÕ and Uzbekistan was additionally involved
in intense bilateral military cooperation with Turkey and the
United States, and it joined the process of building an alliance
distancing itself from Russia. The allied countries were Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM) 6.
After 1999, the Batken events made all the countries of the region,
including Uzbekistan, reflect on them in the same way: Russia is
the one and only country that is capable of offering help in the face
of a threat; Russia is strong, it is the nearest power, and there are
channels of cooperation. Russia took advantage of the situation,
and in autumn and winter 1999 signed a series of bilateral agree-
ments on military cooperation with all the countries in the region
(except for Turkmenistan), and it also prompted international fora
to fight the threat. Among these fora was the Shanghai Five
( Russia, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), and in 2000
Karimov for the first time took part in its sessions. 
Russian passivity during the Batken 2000 crisis chilled Uzbe-
k i s t a nÕs relationship towards Russia considerably; however 
the remaining countries enhanced their cooperation with Russia.
In October 2000 in Bishkek, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Armenia and Belarus signed an agreement on estab-
lishing regional rapid reaction units to fight threats of the Batken
and Afghan type, the priority being the Central Asian direction7.
Political agreements were immediately followed by concrete
actions that were to enable (in terms of legal and organisational
issues) military cooperation, additional armament of the region,
and the stationing of allied forces. The formation of rapid reaction
units gives Russia the opportunity to establish its military pres-
ence beyond the territory of Tajikistan, legally and with the regionÕ s
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consent, or even at its invitation. And this step is an unquestion-
able sign of influence, of the readiness to defend this influence
and to expand it. 
In Central Asia Uzbekistan is the most reluctant country as far as
the attitude towards Russia is concerned. The new agreement
therefore serves as a means to discipline Karimov. And for
UzbekistanÕs neighbours, Russia becomes, in a way, a guardian
of protection against Uzbek expansion. The very idea of regional
forces and Russian presence in the region threatens the strategic
interests of Uzbekistan, which is again trying to distance itself
from Russia and to limit its opportunities to influence the situa-
tion in the region. That is why the presence of Russian troops in
the near vicinity of Uzbekistan does not fit in with the tactical
concessions that Karimov is ready to make. The first step taken
by Russia, evidently aimed at putting Uzbekistan under pressure,
is to establish an air-force base in Chkalovsk (northern Ta j i k i s t a n ) ,
which means that Russian aircrafts need only a dozen minutes 
or so to reach all the strategic structures of Uzbekistan 8. Regional
rapid reaction units are to be created in spring 2001 in the face
of expected IMU operations and the anticipated increase in ten-
sions on the border with Afghanistan, and the odds are that this
time the military forces will not be created on paper only.
Since the TalibanÕs summer offensive, Russia has redoubled its
efforts in monitoring events in Afghanistan, and its position is
decidedly anti-Taliban. Nor does it exclude the possibility of pre-
ventive air raids on the Taliban under the pretext of destroying
terrorist bases. Such action could result in Taliban retaliation
against the neighbouring Central Asian countries. Such an attack
would only confirm the necessity for a Russian presence and for
the existence of regional forces. 
We can therefore speak about the establishment of a regional se-
curity system based on Ru s s i a 9. Russia has the opportunity to apply
strong instruments of pressure on the region, which is significant
in the context of its weak economic position and of the fact that the
instruments it has used until now have lost some of their power. 
What is characteristic of the situation is the fact that while rein-
forcing militarily, Russia is also becoming the main architect of
political life in the region; it creates a system in which life in the
region focuses around Russia itself and its initiatives. For the last
few months there have hardly been any bilateral meetings of
Central Asian heads of states; they met exclusively at the sum-
mit meetings that took place under the aegis of Moscow. What is
also characteristic is the fact that these were not only meetings
concerning security. A good opportunity for a summit meeting is
cooperation within the Eurasian Economic Community, which was
formed only a day before the signing of the agreement to form
rapid reaction units. The Community, which comprises Russia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is to work out
mechanisms that recreate a common economic zone among
these countries. And although in the first quarter since the
Community was established no substantive measures have been
taken (just as was earlier the case with the Customs Union), the
Community remains a political fact with a large potential. 
Russia and the Islamic threat 
in Central Asia
The justification of the increasing military presence in Central
Asia is the lack of stability in the region, and the threat on the part
of subversive Islamic movements like the IMU. We can clearly
answer, without going into details of the IMUÕs history, links and
manifestos, only one question: cui bono? The one who benefits
is probably the one who instigates. The only beneficiary of an
Islamic threat is Russia which, owing to the threat, is strength-
ening its position in the region. 
We should bear in mind that in similar circumstances Russian
bases appeared in Tajikistan10 Ð Russian troops were helping the
authorities in Dushanbe to fight Islamic opposition. Presently
Russian bases are bordering on IMU bases in Tajikistan, and
Russia Ð contrary to its solemn declarations Ð is doing nothing to
eliminate them. On the contrary: IMU preparations for warfare in
2000 took place with the support of government agencies in
Tajikistan, RussiaÕs faithful ally. Russia, just like Tajikistan, was
passive with respect to the battles that were going on in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but it did not however permit any
operations on the territory of Tajikistan, which is what Uzbekistan
was aiming at. This seems to confirm the theory that the exis-
tence of IMU-like groups is convenient for Russia - moreover, it
may be their instigator. Even more so as the IMUÕs main target is
Uzbekistan, which is the main troublemaker for Russia. 
Tajikistan is the most fully implemented model of instability con-
trolled by Russia. There is hardly any civil service any more: the
government does not have the necessary instruments to control
the country and it is compelled to share its powers with local mil-
itary leaders, mafia-clan groups and Russians. Paradoxically,
Tajikistan is the only country in the region in which Islamic par-
ties act legally and former mujahideen sit in the parliament, gov-
ernment and central administration Ð and they are used equally
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by Russians and by the government. Due to its military presence
and involvement in internal conflicts, Russia has secured for
itself an unquestionable dominance in the country, as well as an
instrument for exercising control over the situation in the region.
Tajikistan allows Russian military men to gain the lionÕs share of
profits from drug trafficking, gives them opportunities for promo-
tion, advancing their careers and so on. Russian control over
drugs and the IMU give the most spectacular instruments for
exporting Tajik instability to other countries in the region. 
The arrangements that exist in Tajikistan are very convenient for
Russia and do not require any major input. But they do bring
e n o rmous political benefits. Today Tajikistan is undoubtedly the best
m o d e l for Russia in securing its interest, a model in which controlled
instability and conflicts, both internal and external, are exemplary.
However, the situation may get out of control and this would be a
major threat to Russia. Therefore military presence seems to be
the way to exercise control, not only over the countries of the
region, but also over the mujahideen and over Afghanistan.
Moscow itself is apprehensive of whether danger should be
courted in such a way. Such fears were manifested in direct
secret negotiations conducted with the Taliban from April until
August last year. The negotiations were to prepare Russia for
shaping a peaceful relationship with the Taliban after their then
expected victory over the Northern Alliance. Eventually Moscow
broke off the negotiations and resumed aid to Masoud, showing
that the fears aroused by the mujahideen and the Taliban mean
less than the expected benefits. 
Alternatives and the unknown 
Russia has undoubtedly the strongest impact on the way the sit-
uation in Central Asia is developing, and it is encountering more
and more submission on the part of the countries in the region in
the security field. 
But this in no ways mean that during the process of strengthening
its position in the countries concerned, Russia has not encountered
any opposition, or that it does not have to take the competition into
account, or that it has a grip on every aspect of regional and supra-
regional affairs. First of all, for the last nine years the Central Asian
countries have managed to develop political and economic organ-
isms that have been evolving independently of Russia (with the
least success in the field of security). Year after year in Asia the
l a w, the state administration, the social and economic structures
have resembled less and less the situation in the Ru s s i a n
Federation, which is also changing. For nine years the region has
been open to the world Ð in the economic sense (Russian goods
have been replaced by Iranian, Chinese and Turkish ones) and in
the political sense (although with more difficulty).
Furthermore, other countries apart from Russia are trying to
strengthen their position in Central Asia Ð the United States,
Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, China Ð which is extending the room for
manoeuvre for the countries of Central Asia. The games between
these countries makes Central Asia an important element of the
Great Game, in which the future balance of powers on the whole
continent is at stake Ð or even, through the fact that the greatest
superpowers also take part in the Game, in the world. 
The West and its attitude
towards Central Asia 
in the Batken period
For the West Ð particularly for the United States and Turkey, the
most active states Ð the strategic aim is to have a stable group
of countries, located in the southern part of the former Soviet
Union, which are politically, economically, militarily and cultural-
ly aligned with the West, and which are independent of Russia
and Iran. In this respect it means that they are striving to wrench
the Central Asian countries free from under the political and mil-
itary dominance of Russia. 
Uzbekistan, which has been cooperating in military affairs with
the United States and Turkey, is traditionally the most open to
such initiatives. The Batken crisis in 1999, and the simultaneous
criticism of Karimov for violating human rights expressed by the
West, pushed Tashkent towards Russia. The Batken crisis in 2000
demonstrated, however, the ambiguity of an alliance with Russia
and so created an opportunity to renew close relations with the
West. MoscowÕs initial passive attitude (in the first weeks of the
crisis) contrasted with the revival in the relationships between
Tashkent and Washington, and Tashkent and Ankara. Within just
a few months after August 2000 there were a dozen or so mutual
visits on different levels; Turkish president Ahmed Necdet Sezer,
the Turkish home secretary, military men, politicians and busi-
nessmen were among others all guests in Central Asia, as were
senior civil servants from Washington and the Pentagon, includ-
ing the adviser for the Secretary of State Steven Sestanovich; and
UzbekistanÕs new defence minister paid his first visit abroad to
Washington. A series of detailed agreements concerning the pur-
chase of military equipment, Uzbek training in the West, common
C E S  S t u d i e s
projects for fighting terrorism etc., were made. The United States
suggested its readiness to replace Russia in the role of protector
against the Taliban, as it wanted to carry out air raids on Afgha-
nistan from the territory of Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, but that
situation did not in the end arise. 
Although one can hardly expect that cooperation between
Uzbekistan and the West could acquire a strategic and binding
c h a r a c t e r, it does provide relief for Ta s h kent as it enables to ease
the results of its present political isolation; finally, the cooperation
is a bargaining chip in its relationship with Russia. The policy that
Karimov has pursued until now demonstrates that his political
possibilities are naturally restricted to steering a middle course
between Russia and the West. It seems that this is exactly the
room for manoeuvre, the possibility to influence the interests of
the more powerful countries, this Ômulti-vectorÕ policy that deter-
mines the political independence of the Central Asian countries.
Karimov cannot underestimate Moscow because it is Moscow, and
not Washington, that has every power to keep him or remove him
from office. Reports from the December talks between Ka r i m o v
and Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, make one suppose that
Ta s h kent has taken note of Russian dominance (the new air- f o r c e
base in Chkalovsk has probably contributed to that) and it will
keep trying to play a double game. And it is up to Washington and
A n kara to find a place for their interests in this game. 
ÔThe Great GameÕ 
Ð the southern areas
The future of the Central Asian republics, and the position of
Russia in the Middle East and South Asia, depends for the most
part on the situation in Afghanistan. This is another factor that
keeps escaping RussiaÕs full control. Moscow can influence the
situation in Afghanistan first of all through the Northern Alliance.
By offering or withholding military aid to the Alliance Russia can,
i n d i r e c t l y, influence the balance of power in Afghanistan.
Withholding aid for Masoud in winter 1999 contributed to his defeat
in August and September 2000. On the other hand, a sweeping vic-
tory for the Taliban would be a considerable threat to the strategic
interests of Russia, not only in Afghanistan but also in Central Asia.
One trump card that enables Russia to exercise control over
Central Asia is its control over transport routes of the region. 
A stable situation in Afghanistan would offer an opportunity to
open the region to the south, and to break up RussiaÕs transport
monopoly, which is what Turkmenistan has been trying to do for
years. The victory of the Taliban would at the same time mean 
a considerable increase in the significance of Pakistan Ð the pro-
tector of the Taliban. The high probability of such a situation may
have caused a revolution in Central Asian regional policy. 
In autumn 2000 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and most notably Uzbe-
kistan established unofficial relations with the Taliban, and were
close to recognising them diplomatically (up till now only Pa k i s t a n ,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have done so). For
Karimov such a close relationship with the Taliban, whom he has
been fighting up till now, would allow him to kill two birds with
one stone: to wrench himself free from regional isolation and to
ÔtameÕ the worst enemy Ð militant Islam Ð and thus to weaken
Russian instruments of pressure 11. While visiting Ashkabad and
Astana, the Pakistani leader General Musharraf has attempted to
develop such tendencies in the region. Pakistan is also trying to
take the limelight within the Shanghai Five, which would enable it
to participate in creating the political reality in the region. So far,
however, the Pakistani initiatives have brought about no major
developments. Moreover, the successes of Pakistan and the
Taliban in Afghanistan have enhanced cooperation within the for-
mer strategic triangle of Moscow-Teheran-Delhi, whose help had
enables the Northern Alliance to survive and then to go onto the
counteroffensive 12.
Enhanced cooperation among Russia, Iran and India Ð which
means, apart from cooperation regarding the Afghan issue, also
the development of political and military cooperation Ð can con-
siderably lessen the influence that the United States have on the
processes taking place in Central Asia and in Afghanistan itself,
although it is too early to speak about a future strategic charac-
ter of the triangle. WashingtonÕs attempts to ease the tension in
Afghanistan (among other ways by forming a coalition govern-
ment under the aegis of former king Zahir Shah and the tribal
council, the Loya Jirga), and to eliminate drug trade sources and
Islamic terrorism on the Taliban-controlled territory have brought
no results until now. The successful imposition of UN sanctions
against the Taliban in December 2000, which was something that
the United States had been striving for, and the United StatesÕ
readiness to carry out air raids on terrorist camps operating
under the aegis of the Taliban, have weakened links with
Pakistan, the United StatesÕ only partner in the region. 
These are hardly good prospects for Central Asia: the war in
Afghanistan will not come to an end soon, and so opening up the
south is out of the question; the current Afghan conflict allows
Russia to influence the issue of Islamic threat; and Russian
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activity in Afghanistan may draw Central Asia into the conflict,
which will further strengthen RussiaÕs position. 
Forecasts: 
1. One should expect another IMU attack on Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan. First of all, this is because the IRU was not crushed;
it has relatively large forces at its disposal, and lack of action
deprives it of its raison dÕetre. Secondly, this is due to the pre-
sumption that the IRU is acting at RussiaÕs instigation: an attack
targeted first of all at Uzbekistan would be a way to humiliate
Karimov and to draw him into the orbit of Russian influence. 
2. One should expect that the conflict in Afghanistan will worsen
further. None of the powers that are indirectly engaged in the con-
flict will permit its opponents to dominate Afghanistan. The
Northern Alliance forces will try to regain their position thanks to
outside help. It seems unlikely that the Northern Alliance and
Taliban could enter into a peace agreement and, if this were the
case, it would be impossible for both sides to keep it. The  active
involvement of Russia and its allies in the conflict is a probable
development, for example in the form of conducting air raids,
which would undoubtedly exacerbate the situation in the region. 
3. The aforementioned situation will accelerate the process of
forming the rapid reaction units under the aegis of Russia, estab-
lishing new military bases in Central Asia and providing rein-
forcements for Russian troops on the Afghan border.
4. One should expect serious manifestations of the internal crisis
in Uzbekistan. Karimov is not taking any steps to relieve social
and economic tensions. Uzbekistan will also suffer the most from
IMU attacks - this would enable to prove to Karimov the necessi-
ty for close cooperation with Russia, which will probably suc-
cessfully defend Kyrgyzstan against the IMU. In case Karimov
should further resist such cooperation with Russia, one cannot
exclude a change in presidential office instigated by the Kremlin:
the country has sufficient instability potential to arrange
KarimovÕs removal. One should also bear in mind that in similar
circumstances Russia removed the presidents of Georgia
(Gamsakhurdia) and Azerbaijan (Elchibey). 
5. The development of the situation in the region unambiguously
indicates that the position of Kazakhstan is gaining in impor-
tance. This is the most orderly country with significant economic
potential and human resources, the least endangered by internal
upheaval, including the threat of Islamic fundamentalism.
Uzbekistan weakness, NazarbayevÕs well-balanced policy, and
finally its natural resources make Kazakhstan the most serious
and reliable partner in Central Asia for Russia and for the West,
Iran and Pakistan. 
6 . One should expect further interest from the United States, Tu r ke y
and Pakistan in the region. But the amount of interest 
will depend on internal developments in those countries: on the
policy of the new president of the United States, George Bush,
towards Russia, Iran and Pakistan (during the Clinton presidency
the strategic alliance between the United States and Pakistan was
w e a kened); on stability in Pakistan in the context of escalating
internal conflicts related, among others, to the ÔTa l i b a n i s a t i o nÕ of
Pakistan; finally, on the situation in Iran (apart from many unsolved
problems, Iran is expecting a stormy presidential election).
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